

COMPETING DISCOURSES: RETHINKING THE PREHISTORY OF *MYTHOS* AND *LOGOS*

BRUCE LINCOLN

Heroic accounts of progress and the march of civilization, when narrating the beloved Greek Miracle, regularly grant a prominent place to the transformation in speech and thought that led from the *mythos* of Homer and Hesiod to the *logos* of Heraclitus and Plato, a transformation they associate with the move from symbolic to rational discourse, anthropomorphism to abstraction, and religion to philosophy.¹ Something along these lines happened—and something dramatic, to be sure—but the story is hardly so simple as it is often made out to be. Close reading of the earliest texts raises some serious issues and contains more than a few surprises.

I

Let us begin with an errant detail: a manuscript variation in a well-known line from Hesiod's *Theogony* at the point where the Muses address the poet directly. Most editors agree the text ought to read (27–28):²

1 For older treatments of this theme, see, *inter alia*, Cornford 1912, Nestle 1940, or Snell 1953. More recently, see, for example, Guthrie 1962.1–3, 140–42, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983.72–74, or Schmitter 1991.57–86. Eric Havelock has added an important dimension to this discussion by stressing how important a role was played by the introduction of writing, but in many other ways the story he tells remains much the same as that of his predecessors. See, for instance, Havelock 1982.220–60 and Havelock 1983.

2 West 1966, Mazon 1928, Jacoby 1930, Solmsen 1970, Arrighetti 1984. In recent years, these lines have been the topic of much discussion and commentary. See, *inter alia*, Pucci 1976.8–33, Stroh 1976, Neitzel 1980, Belfiore 1985, Buongiovanni 1987, Ferrari 1988, Pratt 1993.108–12, and Leclerc 1993.204–22.

We know how to recount many falsehoods like real things, and
We know how to proclaim truths when we wish.

ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ', εὗτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.

Here a contrast is drawn between two sorts of content and the modes of speaking appropriate to each, both of which are equally available to the Muses and to those they inspire (Table 1).

To describe the act of relating plausible falsehoods the text uses the verb *legein* and deploys a formulaic line that elsewhere marks one of Odysseus' most skillful (and morally problematic) pieces of deception.³ For telling truths, it settles on a verb that in the *Works and Days* denotes the act of speech with which Justice herself (the goddess Dikē) denounces perjurers and the “bribe-eating” kings who render crooked judgments.⁴

While modern editors confidently read *gērusasthai* in line 28, a great many manuscripts put in its place the more common verb *mythēsasthai* (“to speak, to tell”).⁵ This usage, in turn, resonates with another passage from the *Works and Days*, the culminating line of its Proem, where Hesiod, having called on Zeus to ensure truth and justice in legal proceedings, pledges to speak similarly to his wayward brother Perses (8–10):

3 *Odyssey* 19.203: “Ισκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα. This is said of the story with which the disguised Odysseus hides his identity from his wife and with which he moves her to tears. Odysseus' ability to construct a plausible falsehood in this instance depended on his knowledge of the truth, his desire to conceal or mislead, his verbal and conceptual skills. It is thus clear that the formula *pseudea . . . etymoisin homoia* (which occurs only here and in *Theogony* 27) does not denote innocent errors of fact, but deliberate acts of deception.

4 *Works and Days* 260: γηρύετ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκων νόον. The “bribe-eating kings” (βασιλῆς . . . δωροφόγοι) are mentioned at lines 263–64 with implicit comparison to lines 35–39. γηρύομαι is not attested in Homer, but occurs in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 426 and Delphic Oracle 473.4 (Parke-Wormell 1956.192), with reference to divine proclamations of truth, as has been noted by Delgado 1986.40 and 48–49.

5 In the stemma reconstructed by West 1966.60, there are four main manuscript families: B, a (subdivided into n and v), b, and k (subdivided into K and u). Of these, B and u are fragmentary and do not include line 28. The variant reading μηθύσασθαι is found in all the remaining families, save n (which consists of two manuscripts). Earlier editors preferred γηρύσασθαι on the principle of *lectio difficilior*, a decision that was confirmed by the discovery of two papyri of the 2nd and 3rd century (West's Π¹ and Π²), in which this reading was preserved.

Table 1. Structural contrasts in *Theogony* 27–28

	<i>Mode of speech</i>	<i>Speech content</i>
Line 27	“to recount” (<i>legein</i>)	“falsehoods like real things” (<i>pseudea . . . etymoisin homoia</i>)
	“to proclaim” (<i>gérusasthai</i>)	“truths” (<i>alêthea</i>)
Line 28		

Zeus of the lofty thunder, you who dwell in the highest palace,
Hear me, you who see and perceive: straighten out the
judgments, according to justice!
And I will tell (*mythêsaímén*) real things to Perses.

Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὃς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει.
κλῦθι ἴδων ἀίων τε, δίκη δ' ἵθυνε θέμιστας
τύνη· ἐγὼ δέ κε Πέρσῃ ἐτήτυμα μνθησαίμην.

It is not my intention to argue that the reading of *Theogony* 28 with *mythêsasthai* is preferable, or that it represents “the original” text. Rather, I would simply observe that the existence of this well-attested variant suggests many Greeks found the juxtaposition of *mytheomai* to *legein* the most comprehensible and most effective way to draw a multivalent contrast between true speech and deception (or at least ambiguity), the straight and the crooked; also between that which is superficial and ornamented on the one hand and that which is blunt, but accurate on the other; and, yet again, between the play of poetry and the seriousness of legal struggle.⁶ So far, so good. But to a modern eye, the terms in this equation seem reversed, for contrary to our expectations, it is *mytheomai* (the speech of *mythos*) that is here associated with truth (*alêtheia*), while *legein* (the speech of *logos*) is associated with lies, masquerade, and dissimulation (*pseudea . . . etymoisin homoia*)!

Nowhere else in the Hesiodic corpus does either of these verbs appear save the passages we have considered (*Theogony* 27–28, *Works and*

6 Note also that the Muses inspire two sorts of men who speak two different sorts of speech: kings, who speak in assembly and deliver legal judgments (*Theogony* 81–93), and poets, who sing the deeds of gods and heroes, providing diversion from human griefs (*Theogony* 94–104). Cf. the *Homeric Hymn to the Muses and Apollo* 2–4.

Days 10). If we turn our attention to the corresponding nominal forms, however, the picture becomes more complex—and also more intriguing.

II

Let us begin with *logos*, which occurs five times, but only once in the singular.⁷ This comes when Hesiod introduces his account of the world ages. His narrative, addressed to Perseus with didactic intent, stretches from first things to last and describes the descent of humanity from the original perfection of the Golden Race—unaging, pious, and free from all labor—to the vicious and degraded beings who characterize the present Race of Iron. Yet precisely where a modern reader expects this fabulous discourse to be labelled *mythos*, Hesiod frames it differently, using the term *logos* instead.⁸

Elsewhere *logos* always appears in the plural.⁹ On three occasions it is modified by the adjective *haimulios* (“seductive”), and thrice it appears alongside *pseudea* (“falsehoods”). Consider, for instance, this piece of the creation account (*Theogony* 226–29):

Now loathsome Strife (Eris) gave birth to painful Toil,
Forgetfulness and Hunger, and Pains bearing tears,
Combats and Battles and Murders and Manslaughters,
Quarrels and Falsehoods and *Logoi* and Disputes . . .

Αὐτὰρ Ἔρις στυγερὴ τέκε μὲν Πόνον ἀλγινόεντα
Λήθην τε Λιμόν τε καὶ Ἀλγεα δακρυόεντα
Ὑσμίνας τε Μάχας τε Φόνους τ' Ἀνδροκτασίας τε
Νείκεα τε Ψεύδεα τε Λόγους τ' Ἀμφιλλογίας τε . . .

7 On the earliest uses of *logos*, the most thorough discussion to date is Boeder 1959, who begins with this observation: “Im Epos ist dieses Wort [*logos*] noch wenig gebräuchlich. Die spärlichen Belege nennen es nur im Zusammenhang von Bezauberung, Ablenkung und Irreführung” (p. 82). Also of interest are Fournier 1946 and Calame 1991.

8 *Works and Days* 106: ἔτερόν τοι ἐγὼ λόγον ἐκκορυφώσω. Leclerc 1993.34 translates *logos* “récit fictif” based upon this passage. Regarding Hesiod’s account of the world ages (*Works and Days* 106–201), see Vernant 1974.13–79 and Matthiessen 1979.


9 Conceivably, this is a grammatical reminiscence of a hint the Muses drop regarding the inexhaustibility of linguistic invention: “We know how to recount *many* falsehoods that are like truthful things” (ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖο, *Theogony* 27). Along similar lines, see the North American legends cited by Pettazzoni 1967.12 in which Coyote bested the gods, his false tales being infinitely more numerous than their limited stock of divine truths.

Beyond the generally ominous nature of this list, one perceives subtler points. Thus *Logoi* are joined not only with “Falsehoods” (*Pseudea te Logous*), but also with “Disputes” (*Amphi-logia*, “Opposed *logoi*”) and “Quarrels” to form a set: the verbal forms of conflict, in which women excel. These, in turn, are contrasted with the more manly, physical forms detailed in the preceding line: “Combats and Battles and Murders and Manslaughters” (See Figure 1).

Having inscribed these codes at the level of the divine, Hesiod extends them to the human in his account of Pandora, the first and prototypical woman, into whose breast Hermes placed “falsehoods, seductive *logoi*, and a wily character.”¹⁰ Here, as elsewhere, the adjective *haimulios* marks the erotic power of beguilement and attraction exercised by the words (and speaker) in question. Although the etymology remains unclear, its sense is evident in the following passage (*Works and Days* 373–75):¹¹

Do not let a woman with swaying hips deceive your mind.
Seductive (*haimula*) and cajoling, she’s seeking your granary:
He who puts his trust in a woman, puts his trust in thieves.

Figure 1. Logical and familial relations in *Theogony* 228–29



10 *Works and Days* 78: ψεύδεά θ' αιμυλίους τε λόγους καὶ ἐπίκλοπον ἥθος.

11 On this passage, see Martinazzoli 1960.

μηδὲ γυνή σε νόον πυγοctόλος ἔξαπατάτω
αίμιλα κωτίλλουσα, τεὴν διφῶσα καλιήν·
δὲς δὲ γυναικὶ πέποιθε, πέποιθ' ὅ γε φιλήτησιν.

Although a distrustful and condescending patriarchy attaches its sense of “femininity” to the discourses it labels “falsehoods and seductive *logoi*,” it does not regard them as a female monopoly.¹² Certain men may also use these kinds of speech, but as a consequence they tend to be understood as somehow less than fully male, or somehow more. Consider a complex passage from that section of the *Works and Days* where Hesiod treats calendric lore (782–89):

The middle sixth [i.e., the 16th of the month] is very
unfavorable for plants,
And good for the birth of a boy. It is not favorable for a girl,
Neither to be born in the first place, nor to celebrate a marriage.
Nor is the sixth fitting for the birth of a girl,
But it is a well-disposed day to castrate goats and sheep,
And to put a pen around the flock.
That day is also good for the birth of a boy, who will love to
utter jokes,
Falsehoods, seductive *logoi*, and secret conversations.

ἔκτη δ' ἡ μέσση μάλ' ἀσύμφορός ἐστι φυτοῖσιν,
ἀνδρογόνος δ' ἀγαθή· κούρῃ δ' οὐ σύμφορός ἐστιν
οὔτε γενέσθαι πρῶτ' οὔτ' ἀρ γάμου ἀντιβολῆσαι.
οὐδὲ μὲν ἡ πρώτη ἔκτη κούρῃ γε γενέσθαι
ἄρμενος, ἀλλ' ἐρίφους τάμνειν καὶ πώεα μήλων,
σηκόν τ' ἀμφιβαλεῖν ποιμνήιον ἥπιον ἥμαρ·
ἐσθλὸν δ' ἀνδρογόνος· φιλέοι δ' ὅ γε κέρτομα βάζειν
ψεύδεα θ' αίμυλίους τε λόγους κρυφίους τ' ὀαρισμούς.

Embedded within these lines is a formal analysis of the ways in which the two days in question interact with three categories, each of which is treated as a binary opposition. These are: a) fortune (auspicious or

12 Regarding the attitudes of Hesiod and his contemporaries toward women, see Arrighetti 1981, Marquardt 1982, Arthur 1983, and Rudhardt 1986, along with the broader discussion of Bergren 1983.

inauspicious); b) human beings (male and female); and c) other living beings (animals and plants) (Table 2).

Although the two portions of this passage are closely related, they do differ in some respects. Thus, most obviously, the first portion (782–84) speaks about men, women, and plants, but not animals; the second (785–89), about men, women, and animals, but not plants. Attempting to fill in the gaps, one is thus led to infer the following analogies.

Men : Women :: Animals : Plants
Men : Animals :: Women : Plants.

The gaps also focus our attention on what *is* actually said about plants and animals in the two sections of the text, and here we encounter another difference. The remarks on plants are vague and global: “Very unfavorable for plants.”¹³ Not so those for beasts: “It is a well-disposed day to castrate goats and sheep,”¹⁴ a recommendation with considerable precision and import, but for animals of one gender only. And one notes a logical nicety: the recommended activity effectively destroys the characteristic for which these beasts were selected or, to put it in Lévi-Straussian terms, after positing an initial contrast of male and female, the text seeks a mediation of these opposed categories that it finds in neutered animals and the process of castration.

The import of these points becomes apparent when we find that this same day “is also good for the birth of a boy, who will love to utter jokes, falsehoods, seductive *logoi*, and secret conversations.”¹⁵ Such a person occupies the same ambiguous position within the human realm that geldings do within the animal. Though male, he prefers persuasion (*peithô*)

Table 2. The auspiciousness (+) and inauspiciousness (–) of certain days for specific classes of being according to *Works and Days* 782–89

	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Animals</i>	<i>Plants</i>
The sixteenth (lines 782–84)	+	–	[+]	–
The sixth (lines 785–89)	+	–	+	[–]

13 *Works and Days* 782: μάλ’ ἀσύμφορός ἐστι φυτοῖσιν.

14 *Works and Days* 786: ἄρμενος, ἀλλ’ ἐρίφους τάμνειν καὶ πώει μήλων.

15 *Works and Days* 788–89: ἐσθλὴ δ’ ἀνδρογόνος· φιλέοι δ’ ὅ γε κέρτομα βάζειν / ψεύδεά θ’ αίμυλίους τε λόγους κρυφίους τ’ ὀστρισμούς.

to force (*biē* or *kratos*) and delights in words rather than deeds (*erga*). Moreover, the kinds of speech he favors have “feminine” associations, which is to say they are playful and winsome, even flirtatious, but unscrupulous and manipulative nonetheless. Effective for the speaker, such words are correspondingly dangerous to the hearer, for with and through them, those who are weaker—women in particular, but others as well—repeatedly overcome those more gifted in physical strength.

The kind of cunning that lets the weak overcome the strong—or, to put it more properly, that lets those whose power rests in their wiles and words overcome those with power of arms and armies—was known as *mētis* among the Greeks and has been discussed in magisterial fashion by Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant (1991). Within the *Theogony*, this intelligence of wiles and ruses is personified as the goddess Mētis, whom Zeus marries immediately after he has made himself king in heaven, hoping to domesticate her and bring her powers under his control.¹⁶

Far from solving Zeus’ problem, however, this shifts the issue to a different level. Thus, when Mētis becomes pregnant, her lord becomes worried, and his disquiet is the narrative coding of an abstract point: a more fully accomplished synthesis of force and cunning (such as that anticipated in the product of this marital union) will prevail over an earlier, less perfect form of the same synthesis (such as that manifest in the union itself). So, when oracles predict that Mētis will bear a daughter, then a son, and the son will overthrow his father, Zeus responds by swallowing Mētis. That is, he brings her under his control in definitive fashion by fully encompassing her powers. From her home deep in his body (specifically, in his *nēdus*, a term that means “womb,” as well as “belly”),¹⁷ his newly internalized female voice of (female) cunning thereafter warns him of all dangers and suggests strategies through which he can overcome them. With this, at last, his sovereignty is secure.

One problem remains for the text to work out: it must explain to us why Mētis did not foresee Zeus’ attack, she who was “most knowing among deities and mortal men.”¹⁸ The answer is as simple as it is elegant: to

16 The story is recounted at *Theogony* 886–900. See further Detienne and Vernant 1991.107–12, Bonnafé 1985.81–87, and Rammoux 1987.

17 *Theogony* 890 and 899. For *nēdus* with the sense of “womb,” cf. *Theogony* 460 and *Iliad* 24.496. Note that Athene finishes her gestation in this same ambiguous space, with Zeus as her male mother.

18 *Theogony* 887: πλεῖστα θεῶν εἰδυῖαν ιδὲ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

overcome Mêtis, the most powerful of males did that which was least expected. He relied not on his force, but on such “feminine” cunning as he already possessed, thereby turning Mêtis’ own weapons against her (*Theogony* 889–90).

Having deceived her by the guile in his breast
And by seductive *logoi*, Zeus put her down into his belly.

δόλῳ φρένας ἐξαπατήσας
αίμυλίοισι λόγοισιν ἐῇ ἐσκάτθετο νηδύν.

III

Within the Homeric poems (hymns as well as epics), the term *logos* covers much the same semantic range that it does in Hesiod, although with a few different nuances and shades of meaning. Most strikingly, Homer’s *logoi* are always set in opposition to some situation or threat of violent struggle. In all instances, the term denotes acts of speech—often soothing, sometimes deceitful—that persuade men either to abandon the battlefield and renounce physical force, or to find comfort and solace in moments of peace. The voices of official and conventional morality, however, tend to depict those who use and those who are influenced by such speech as irresponsible, womanly, or childish in nature. Thus, for instance, these lines from the first book of the *Odyssey* reflect not only on Calypso, but also on Odysseus, who—insofar as he is captivated by her *logoi*—abandons his heroic destiny (*Odyssey* 1.55–57):

Calypso, Atlas’ daughter, restrained him from misery and
lamentation;
Ever with soft and seductive *logoi*
She beguiled him in such a way that he became forgetful of
Ithaca.

τοῦ θυγάτηρ δύστηνον ὁδυρόμενον κατερύκει,
αἱεὶ δὲ μαλακοῖσι καὶ αίμυλίοισι λόγοισιν
θέλγει, ὅπως Ἰθάκης ἐπιλήσεται·

Again, there is a scene in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* where Apollo confronts the new-born Hermes and charges his baby brother (“not

unjustly”) with stealing his cattle.¹⁹ Here, as elsewhere, the text contrasts Apollo with Hermes along multiple lines: elder vs. younger, stronger (*krateros*) vs. weaker, truthful vs. duplicitous, responsible vs. inventive, moral vs. wily. From the moment of his birth, Hermes is “seductive in his cunning” (*haimulo-mêtês*), and a master of guiles.²⁰ When challenged by Apollo, he knows how to respond (317–18):

With his crafts and seductive *logoi*,
He wanted to trick the god of the silver bow.

αὐτὰρ ὁ τέχνησίν τε καὶ αἰμυλίοισι λόγοισιν
ἥθελεν ἐξαπατᾶν κυλλήνιος Ἀργυρότοξον·

Similar themes of wily speech and escape from violent conflict figure in an *Iliad* vignette in which all the Greek troops fall out to attack save the Cephallenians—who somehow missed the call to battle. The text depicts this as a minor slip in the fog of war but, misreading the situation, the ever-astute Agamemnon harshly rebukes Menestheus, the Cephallenian leader (*Iliad* 4.339–40):

You who are surpassing in evil guiles, wily of spirit,
Why do you stand by, cowering in fear? Why do you wait for
others?

καὶ σύ, κακοῖσι δόλοισι κεκασμένε, κερδαλεόφρον,
τίπτε καταπτώσσοντες ἀφέστατε, μίμνετε δ' ἄλλους;

Agamemnon regards Menestheus not just as a coward, but also as a deceiver, to judge from the insults he chooses, both drawn from the vocabulary of *mêtis*: “wily of spirit” (*kerdaleophron*) and “you who are surpassing in evil guiles” (*kakoisi doloisi kekasmene*). Most interesting, however, is a textual variant of the latter phrase found in a papyrus that

19 *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 316: οὐκ ἀδίκως ἐπὶ βουσὶν ἐλάζυτο κύδιμον Ἐρμῆν.

20 Hermes is referred to by a host of terms that play on the vocabulary of *mêtis*, *haimulos*, and *dolos* (“snare, guile”): *haimulomêtês* (line 13), *poikilomêtês* (155, 514), *dolophrades* (282), *polymêtis* (318), *dolomêtês* (405), and his use of *doloi* is also mentioned at lines 66, 76, and 86. Regarding Hermes and the character he assumes in this hymn, the discussion of Brown 1947 retains its value. See also Croci 1977/78, Kahn 1978, and Herter 1981.

reads “you who are surpassing in evil *logoi*” (*kakoisi logoisi kekasmene*).²¹ Here *logoi* replace *doloi*, wits and words being functionally interchangeable as the instruments through which shrewd actors can save their skins from the risks of war.

The last occurrence of *logoi* in Homer comes in a particularly poignant scene of the *Iliad*, one on which the whole epic turns. The stage is set when the Ormenian hero Eurypylus falls wounded²² and Achilles sends Patroclus to make inquiries, a move the authorial voice calls “the beginning of evil” (*kakou . . . arkhē*, 11.604). After consulting with Nestor, however, Patroclus pauses to treat Eurypylus’ wound (11.809–48), and Book 11 ends as he cuts the arrow from the Ormenian’s thigh and stanches the blood with healing herbs. The epic then drops this narrative thread to dwell on the fury of Hector’s assault. Only toward the middle of Book 15 does it return to Patroclus and Eurypylus (*Iliad* 15.390–400):

As long as the Achaeans and Trojans
Battled around the wall, beyond the shelter of the swift ships,
Patroclus sat in the hut of kindly Eurypylus.
He entertained him with *logoi* and on his baleful wound
He sprinkled drugs to cure the dark pains.
But when he perceived the Trojans rushing upon the wall,
As shouts and panic rose among the Danaans,
He cried out in distress and smote his thighs
With the flat of his hands, and wailing, he uttered this speech:
“Eurypylus, I can no longer stay here with you,
Notwithstanding your need, for a great struggle has arisen.”

Πάτροκλος δ’ ἥις μὲν Ἀχαιοί τε Τρῶές τε
τείχεος ἀμφεμάχοντο θοάων ἔκτοθι νηῶν,
τοφρ’ ὅ γ’ ἐνὶ κλισίῃ ἀγαπήνορος Εὐρυηνύλοιο
ἥστο τε καὶ τὸν ἔτερπε λόγοις, ἐπὶ δ’ ἔλκει λυγρῷ
φάρμακ’ ἀκέσματ’ ἔπασσε μελαινάων ὁδυνάων.
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τεῖχος ἐπεσσυμένους ἐνόησε
Τρῶας, ἀτὰρ Δαναῶν γένετο ἰαχή τε φόβος τε,
φύμαζέν τ’ ἄρ’ ἔπειτα καὶ ὡ πεπλήγετο μηρῷ

21 This reading is from British Museum Papyrus 136, which dates to the third century c.e.

22 *Iliad* 2.734–36. Eurypylus figures occasionally in the fighting (5.76–79, 6.36, 8.265) and is among those who cast lots for the right to duel Hector (7.167). He is treated as a major hero whose wound bodes particularly ill for the Greeks at 11.660–62 and 16.25–27.

χερσὶ καταπρηνέσσ', ὀλοφυρόμενος δ' ἔπος ηῦδα·
“Εὐρύπυλ', οὐκέτι τοι δύναμαι χατέοντί περ' ἔμπης
ἐνθάδε παρμενέμεν· δὴ γὰρ μέγα νεῖκος ὅρωρεν·”

Initially, we behold an enchanted space of tranquility and companionship where Patroclus' *logoi* soothe the spirit, much as his drugs (*pharmaka*) ease bodily pain. But when Trojan troops breach the Greeks' defensive wall, threatening annihilation, this island of calm cannot be maintained and the text shifts abruptly. With the hand that a moment before spread balm on Eurypylus' stricken thigh, Patroclus now bitterly smites his own. And the voice that entertained²³ breaks into a harsher, but also a more realistic speech, which the text denotes as *epos*: “Eurypylus, I can no longer stay here, notwithstanding your need. A great struggle has arisen.”²⁴ From here, the story goes hurtling to its end. Patroclus hastens from Eurypylus to Achilles, and thence into battle. The healer becomes the warrior who will kill, be killed, and draw others after him in a brutal story we know too well.

IV

It should now be clear that the most ancient texts consistently use the term *logos* to mark a speech of women, the weak, the young, and the

23 The verb used in 15.392 is *terpein*, which Hesiod uses for the effect the Muses' singing has on Father Zeus (*Theogony* 37 and 51). This root also figures in the names of two Muses (Eu-terpē and Terpsi-chorē) and the capacity to delight, both aesthetically and erotically, that Hesiod attributes to the Muses and Aphrodite (*terpsis*: *Theogony* 917 and 206 respectively). In Homer, it is frequently associated with poetry (*Iliad* 1.474, 9.186, 189; *Odyssey* 1.347, 8.45, 17.385), music (*Iliad* 18.526), song and dance (*Odyssey* 1.422 = 18.305).

24 The two sections of the passage may be contrasted.

Rest and Action in Patroclus' Speech			
	<i>Site and nature of battle</i>	<i>Patroclus' actions</i>	<i>Patroclus' speech</i>
Rest (15.390–93)	Around the wall	“He sprinkled drugs to cure the dark pains.”	“He entertained with words (<i>eterpe logois</i>). ”
Action (15.394–400)	Trojans breach the wall: “Shouts and panic.”	“He cried out in distress and smote his thighs.”	“Wailing, he uttered this speech” (<i>olophuromenos d'epos êuda</i>). ”

shrewd; a speech that tends to be soft, delightful, charming, and alluring, but one that can also deceive and mislead. While it may be heard in many places and contexts, it is absent from the battlefield and the assembly-place, for it is the nature—indeed, the genius—of this discourse to outflank and offset the physical, political, and material advantages of those who are accustomed to prevail on just such terrains (Table 3).

As a weapon of the weak, *logos* is open to a wide variety of readings that reflect—sometimes more and sometimes less openly—the interests and sympathies of those who hear and comment. Authorial and authoritative voices most often characterize it as unprincipled and treacherous. But it can also be depicted as an effective instrument through which sympathetic figures struggle against serious obstacles to accomplish reasonable, even admirable, goals, as when Hermes seeks to level an uneven playing field against Apollo, or when Patroclus works to calm Eurypylus and soothe his pains.

So much for *logos*. What of the term with which it is so often contrasted in scholarly literature? What sorts of speech does *mythos* denote in the earliest texts? In Hesiod, this word occurs six times and, with one exception (to which we shall return), it always denotes the rough speech of headstrong men who are proud of their strength and bent on victory at all costs.

Thus, for example, there is a moment when Zeus asks the Ouranids—the incarnations of warrior might—to pit their “great force and irresistible hands” against the Titans and to help him fight “for victory and power.”²⁵ Although the Titans are their own brothers, the Ouranids agree, and their pledge of support is termed a *mythos*.²⁶ Similarly, when Gaia proposes to her children that they take the adamantine sickle she has newly devised and use it to castrate their tyrannous father, at first the young gods are speechless with dread (*Theogony* 168–72):

Then, becoming bold, great Cronus, devious in his cunning,
Responded quickly with these *mythoi*:
“Mother, I promise I will bring this deed to fulfillment.

25 *Theogony* 646–50: ἦδη γὰρ μάλα δηρὸν ἐναντίοι ἀλλήλοισι / νίκης καὶ κάρτεος πέρι μαρνάμεθ' ἡμοτα πάντα, / Τιτῆνές τε θεοὶ καὶ ὅσιοι Κρόνου ἐκγενόμεσθα. / ἡμεῖς δὲ μεγάλην τε βίην καὶ χειρας ἀάπτους / φαίνετε Τιτῆνεσσιν ἐναντίον ἐν δαιὶ λυγρῆ.

26 *Theogony* 664–66: ὃς φάτ· ἐπῆγησαν δὲ θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἔάων / μῦθον ἀκούσαντες· πολέμου δ' ἐλιλαίετο θυμὸς / μᾶλλον ἔτ' ἢ τὸ πάροιθε·

Table 3. Uses of *logos* in Hesiod and Homer

Passage	In plural	“seductive”	Modified by haimulios	Alongside falsehoods (pseudea)	Redolent of guile (mētis)	Discourse of the weak	Explicitly “feminine” association	Anithetic to marital or legal conflict
<i>Th.</i> 27 Muses			X		X	X	X	X
<i>Th.</i> 229 Eris' children	X			X	X	X	X	X
<i>Th.</i> 890 Zeus, Mētis	X		X		X		X	X
<i>WD</i> 78 Pandora	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
<i>WD</i> 106 World Ages					?	X		X
<i>WD</i> 789 Boy born on 6th	X		X		X	X	X	X
<i>Od.</i> 1.56 Calypso	X		X		X		X	X
<i>HH</i> 4.317 Hermes	X		X		X		X	X
<i>Il.</i> 4.339 Menestheus	X		X		X		X	X
<i>Il.</i> 15.392 Patroclus	X					?	X	

I have no regard for our father, he of the evil name,
For he first contrived unseemly deeds.”

Θαρσήσας δὲ μέγας Κρόνος ὀγκυλομήτης
αἰψ’ αὐτίς μύθοισι προσηγύδα μητέρα κεδνήν·
“μῆτερ, ἐγὼ κεν τοῦτο γ’ ὑποσχόμενος τελέσαιμι
ἔργον, ἐπεὶ πατρός γε δυσωνύμου οὐκ ἀλεγίζω
ἡμετέρου· πρότερος γὰρ ἀεικέα μῆσατο ἔργα.”

In both these instances, speakers commit themselves to a violent struggle and, what is more, a struggle against their own kin. Facing these cruel realities without illusion or sugarcoating, they pledge to fight and win, confident in their bodies’ force. In deeds, moreover, they make good on their commitments: their speech is raw and crude, but true. In this, as in their physical might, they resemble nothing so much as the hawk in the story Hesiod relates, directly he has finished telling Perseus the *logos* of World Ages (*Works and Days* 202–12):²⁷

Now I will tell a fable to the kings, and they will think on
themselves.
Thus the hawk addressed the nightingale, she of the dappled
throat,
Bearing her in his claws high in the clouds, after having laid
hold of her.
She, stuck between his talons, piteously
Wept, and forcefully he spoke this *mythos* to her:
“Good lady, why do you screech? One who is far your better
has you.
You will go where I take you, you who are a singer.
I will make you my dinner or let you go if I wish.
Senseless is he who wishes to pit himself against those who are
more powerful:
He deprives himself of victory and suffers pains in disgrace.”
Thus spoke the swift-flying hawk, the bird of long wings.

Νῦν δ’ αἰνον βασιλεῦσιν ἐρέω φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς·
ώδ’ ἵρηξ προσέειπεν ἀηδόνα ποικιλόδειρον

27 On this parable, see Bonnafé 1983, Schmidt 1983, Lonsdale 1989, and Leclerc 1992.

ὕψι μάλ’ ἐν νεφέεσσι φέρων ὄνυχεσσι μεμαρπάς·
 ἦ δ’ ἐλεόν, γναμπτοῖσι πεπαρμένη ἀμφ’ ὄνυχεσσι,
 μύρετο· τὴν ὅ γ’ ἐπικρατέως πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν·
 “δαιμονίη, τί λέληκας; ἔχει νύ σε πολλὸν ἀρείων·
 τῇ δ’ εῖς ἦ σ’ ἀν ἐγώ περ ἄγω καὶ ἀοιδὸν ἐοῦσαν·
 δεῖπνον δ’, αἴ κ’ ἐθέλω, ποιήσομαι ἡὲ μεθήσω.
 ἄφρων δ’, ὃς κ’ ἐθέλῃ πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν·
 νίκης τε στέρεται πρός τ’ αἴσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχει.”
 ὃς ἔφατ’ ὠκυπέτης ἥρηξ, τανυσίπτερος ὄρνις.


The hawk and the nightingale stand in stark contrast: male vs. female (such are the genders of the nouns *irêx* and *aêdôn*), predator vs. prey, high vs. low, stronger (*areiôn, kreissôn*) vs. weaker, the arrogant and brutal vs. the frightened but attractive (“she of the dappled throat”). Regarding their speech, the differences are also patent. The nightingale, famous throughout the world for the beauty and mournful quality of her song,²⁸ is said to weep piteously (*eleon . . . myreto*), although the hawk—brute that he is—characterizes her cry as little more than a screech (*lelêkas*). In contrast, the hawk speaks forcefully (*epikrateôs*), without euphemism or grace, describing a cruel world with more candor than tact. His discourse is typical of those most confident in their power and confident also in the right of the powerful to prevail. The text labels it *mythos*.

If *mythoi* on the battlefield have this character, *mythoi* uttered within agonistic assemblies are somewhat more complex for they come in “straight” and “crooked” varieties (Figure 2).

“Straight” *mythoi* resemble those spoken in combat. Sometimes they take the form of upright pronouncements by honest judges and witnesses;²⁹ alternatively, they may appear as the unvarnished assertions of men who believe their strength, position in society, and/or the justice of their cause entitles them to prevail. In contrast, acts of perjury and corrupt judgments constitute “crooked” *mythoi*. Unprincipled and untrue, they permit the worse sort of case and the worse sort of man to prevail; that is, within legal contexts, they function much as *logoi* do elsewhere. That such things are possible, Hesiod knows from experience, and he describes how

28 Cf. *Odyssey* 19.518–22.

29 Thus *Iliad* 18.508, *Theogony* 86, *Works and Days* 7, 9, 36, 224, 226, and 263.

Figure 2. The relations of *mythos* and *logos* in Hesiod

his brother Perses swore false oaths and bribed greedy kings in order to cheat him of his inheritance. Faced with this situation, the poet calls on Perses to mend his ways and implores the kings to “straighten out the *mythoi*.³⁰ He also laments that such occurrences, virtually unheard of in better times, are becoming the rule among men of the present Race of Iron (*Works and Days* 190–94):

³⁰ *Works and Days* 263: ταῦτα φυλασσόμενοι, βασιλῆς, ιθύνετε μύθους. The dispute between Hesiod and Perses is discussed at *Works and Days* 35–39 and again at 274–85.

There will be no favor shown to the person who is true to his
 oath, nor to him who is just,
 Nor to the good man; rather, men glorify arrogance (*hybris*)
 And the doer of evils. They take justice into their own hands,
 and there is no
 Shame. He who is evil will damage the better man,
 Speaking with crooked *mythoi* as he takes the oath.

οὐδὲ τις εὐόρκου χάρις ἔσσεται οὐδὲ δικαίου
 οὐδ’ ἀγαθοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ κακῶν ῥεκτῆρα καὶ ὕβριν
 ἀνέρα τιμήσουσι· δίκη δὲ ἐν χερσί· καὶ αἰδὼς
 οὐκ ἔσται, βλάψει δὲ ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρείονα φῶτα
 μύθοισι σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δὲ ὄρκον ὀμεῖται.

The picture Hesiod paints is intentionally bleak, consistent with the goal of his World Ages discourse: a discourse the text identifies as *logos*, thereby framing it as a “plausible falsehood” told for strategic purpose and rhetorical effect. Here Hesiod recounts to Perses a devolutionary narrative, ending with men of the Iron Race, who cheat one another, give false testimony, and among whom “A brother is not dear, as he formerly was.”³¹ Such people, he continues, can look forward to nothing but suffering, misery, and destruction at the hand of Zeus. Slyly and audaciously, he thus (mis)represents his own particular interests as if they were universal, suggesting to Perses that should he “set straight” his crooked *mythoi* and settle their dispute on terms more favorable to the poet, he will not only restore their proper brotherly relations, but in so doing he will reverse the most fearful tendencies of their Age and help check humanity’s slide to perdition.

The *logos* of the World Ages is thus one of the instruments through which Hesiod hoped to overcome a man who had bested him in legal struggle, a man better connected, more powerful, and more ruthless than he. Toward that end, he spoke as one inspired by the Muses, deploying the verbal gifts given him by these mysterious goddesses. We began our discussion by considering the way they described their own powers of speech, but we have not yet paid attention to the way their discourse is framed in the text (*Theogony* 24–28):

31 *Works and Days* 184: οὐδὲ κασίγνητος φίλος ἔσσεται, ὡς τὸ πάρος περ. More fully, see *Works and Days* 176–201.

The goddesses first spoke forth this *mythos* to me,
 The Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus:
 “You shepherds dwelling in the fields are a shameful lot,
 nothing but bellies.
 We know how to recount (*legein*) many falsehoods like real
 things, and
 We know how to proclaim truths when we wish.”

τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον,
 Μοῦσαι Ὄλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοι·
 “ποιμένες ὄγραυλοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
 ἵδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
 ἵδμεν δ’, εὗτ ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.”

This is the only time the word *mythos* appears in Hesiod outside a context of battle or assembly, and the only time such a discourse passes through a female’s mouth (Table 4). Its use, moreover, is pointed and precise, for with it the text resolves a serious logical conundrum. Thus, if we treat lines 27–28 as a proposition {P} having two parts: {P₁} (= the Muses’ assertion “We can speak truths”), and {P₂} (= “We can tell lies resembling truths”), two hypotheses are possible regarding {P}.

- 1) {P} is true, in which case both {P₁} and {P₂} are true. Accordingly, any utterance of the Muses—including {P}—may be true or false. Our stance toward {P} and all Musely utterances must therefore be one of doubt and suspicion.
- 2) {P} is false, in which case three alternatives are open:
 - a) Both {P₁} and {P₂} are false (−{P₁} and −{P₂}): the Muses can speak neither truth nor falsehood;
 - b) +{P₁} and −{P₂}: They can speak truth, but not falsehood;
 - c) −{P₁} and +{P₂}: They can speak falsehood, but not truth.
 If {P} itself is false, however, we can eliminate the first two of these alternatives, for the Muses’ ability to speak falsehood is demonstrated in this very instance. We then must conclude that the Muses—and poets inspired by them, Hesiod included—speak falsehoods only. Our stance in this instance will not be doubt, but active disbelief and rejection.

To avoid the profoundly destabilizing consequences of Hypothesis 2c, one would like to confirm Hypothesis 1. As we saw, however,

Table 4. Uses of *mythos* in Hesiod

	<i>Blunt truths</i>	<i>Discourse of the stronger</i>	<i>Explicitly “masculine” association</i>	<i>In context of martial aggression</i>	<i>In context of legal aggression</i>	<i>Modified by skolios (“crooked”)</i>
<i>Th. 24</i>						
Muses	X	?				
<i>Th. 169</i>	X	X		X		
Cronus	X	X		X		
<i>Th. 665</i>						
Ouranids	X	X		X		
<i>WD 194</i>			X	X		
Iron Age		X			X	
<i>WD 206</i>	X	X		X		
The Hawk						
<i>WD 263</i>						
Perjurors and corrupt kings		X		X		X

Hypothesis 1 can neither be proven nor disproven on the basis of internal evidence and logical inference. What is more, any attempt to act on it leads to its own undoing. At this impasse, the authorial voice intervenes decisively and identifies {P} as a *mythos*, which is to say, an unvarnished truth advanced by powerful figures, who speak in a manner both gruff and aggressive.³²

V

In Homer, *mythos* often denotes what it normally does in Hesiod: a blunt and aggressive act of candor, uttered by powerful males in the heat of battle or agonistic assembly.³³ Thus when Agamemnon rejects Chryses' entreaties and orders him from the place of assembly under threat of (sacrilegious) violence, that is a *mythos* (*Iliad* 1.25=1.379, 1.33). Addressing Agamemnon's ambassadors, Achilles speaks "without concern for the consequences or the feelings of others" (*apēlegeōs*) and calls his shockingly direct rejection of their offers a *mythos* (9.309). Similarly, when Poseidon refuses Zeus' order to withdraw from battle, asserting that he is equal to Zeus in honor and also no coward, his "powerful and unyielding" speech is also termed a *mythos* (15.202). And when Odysseus halts the Greek soldiers in their flight to the ships, clubbing them with his scepter, he speaks thus to them: "Sit still and hearken to the *mythos* of others, who are mightier than you: you, who are unwarlike, helpless, and not to be counted on in battle or in assembly."³⁴

32 Absolute stability is, of course, never accomplished. There remains the nasty possibility that a lying poet—inspired by lying Muses—lies when he says the Muses speak true, when in fact they are lying about their capacity to speak truth. One enters here an infinite regress, the nature of which has considerable import for the claims of authority made by Hesiod and by epic poetry in general. At present, however, we have seen enough to establish the point of immediate interest to us: in *Theogony* 24, the poet's use of the lexeme *mythos* is motivated by his desire to mark the Muses' speech as trustworthy and true.

33 In addition to the passages cited below, see, *inter alia*, *Iliad* 1.273, 1.388, 1.565, 2.282, 2.335, 3.76, 3.87, 4.357, 4.412, 5.715, 7.404, 9.62, 11.839, 14.127, 16.83, 16.199, 19.85, 19.107, 19.220, 20.369, 22.281, 24.571; *Odyssey* 1.273, 1.361=21.355, 2.77, 2.83, 5.98, 8.302, 10.189, 10.561, 23.62; *Hymn to Hermes* 29, 154, 253, 261, 300.

34 *Iliad* 2.198–202: "Ον δ' αὐτὸν δήμου τ' ἄνδρα Ίδοι βοώντα τ' ἐφεύροι, / τὸν σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσσασκεν ὄμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ· / "δαιμόνι", ἀτρέμας ἡσο κοὶ ἄλλων μῦθον ἄκουε, / οἵ σέο φέρτεροί εἰσι, σὺ δ' ἀπτόλεμος καὶ ἄναλκις, / οὔτε ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναριθμιος οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ·"

Also noteworthy is the following passage from the *Odyssey* in which Telemachus addresses his mother (*Odyssey* 1.356–61):³⁵

“Go to your chambers, and tend to your works:
The loom and the yarn, and order the servants
To get to work. And *mythos* will be of concern to men—
To all men, and especially to me, for power in this household is
mine.”
And she, struck with wonder, went back to her chambers
And took to heart the *mythos* of her child.

“ἀλλ᾽ εἰς οἶκον ιοῦσα τὰ σ᾽ αὐτῆς ἔργα κόμιζε,
ιστόν τ' ἡλακάτην τε, καὶ ἀμφιπόλοισι κέλευε
ἔργον ἐποίχεσθαι· μῦθος δ' ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει
πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ' ἐμοί· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ.”
Ἡ μὲν θαμβήσασα πάλιν οἶκόνδε βεβήκει·
παιδὸς γὰρ μῦθον πεπνυμένον ἔνθετο θυμῷ.

The most exhaustive study to date of *mythos* in the epic is that of Martin 1989 who found that in 155 out of the 167 times (93%) that *mythos* or the verb *mytheomai* appear in the *Iliad* the situation was one in which a powerful male either gives orders or makes boasts. In his view, *mythos* is always a speech redolent of power, performed at length, in public, by one in a position of authority. Normally, a *mythos* forces consent from those to whom it is addressed, and only those equal in status to the speaker are free to contest such a proclamation. The situation, then, is very much like that we have encountered in Hesiod: *mythos* is an assertive discourse of power and authority that represents itself as something to be believed and obeyed.³⁶ Nowhere in the epic does it mean “false story,” “symbolic story,” “sacred story,” or anything of the sort.

35 This passage is repeated at *Odyssey* 21.350–55 with variation in one word only, but that a significant one. For, in 21.352, *toxon* (“bow”) appears where *mythos* is found in 1.358. In this fashion, the speech of *mythos* is established as the functional equivalent of that weapon that in this epic figures as the hallmark of rightful, adult, male strength.

36 Although he does not consider the *Odyssey* in detail, Martin 1989.14 indicates that he found *mythos* to be used in the same fashion in both Homeric poems.

VI

Our revised understanding of these words has considerable import for the way we understand the history of speech, thought, and knowledge/power relations—sufficient import, perhaps, that the first chapter in standard histories of western philosophy will require substantial modification. What Heraclitus championed as *logos*—“not simply language but rational discussion, calculation, and choice: rationality as expressed in speech, in thought, and in action,” as one commentator puts it³⁷—is not what his predecessors took *logos* to be. Similarly, the *mythos* Plato sought to devalue had little in common with what Hesiod and Homer understood by that term.

Rather than taking the usage of a Heraclitus or a Plato to be normative, *ex post facto*, it is preferable to understand them in their proper moment as nothing more (but also nothing less) than strategic—and ultimately successful—attempts to redefine and revalorize the terms in question. Accordingly, our view of the lexemes “*mythos*” and “*logos*” must become more dynamic. These are not words with fixed meanings (indeed, no such words exist); nor did their meanings change glacially over time, as the result of impersonal processes. Rather, these words, along with many others, were the sites of pointed and highly consequential semantic skirmishes fought between rival régimes of truth.³⁸

The issues in these struggles were serious, and the stakes were high. Whose speech would be perceived as persuasive, and whose merely beguiling? Who would inspire trust, and who arouse suspicion? Which discourses would be associated with “truth,” and which (at best) with “plausible falsehoods?” Whose constructs would hold the status of knowledge, and whose superstition? Whose characteristic practices of analysis, explication, pedagogy, and the like would command respect, and whose inspire a snicker? Whose speech (and style of speaking) would be invested with authority? The connection of these to questions of power is not difficult to perceive: Who would attract students? Who counsel rulers? Whose words would be preserved, cited, and studied thereafter?

Well into the fifth century, the meanings and values attached to

37 Kahn 1979.102.

38 The best treatment remains Havelock 1963. For different approaches, see Rosen 1988, Gould 1990, and Lincoln 1993. Also relevant and important are the discussions of Detienne 1986, Veyne 1988, and Brisson 1982.

mythos and *logos* remained unstable, contested, and the balance of power between them unresolved. Although Herodotus shows evidence for a positive use of *logos* against a negative use of *mythos*, Hecataeus began his history with the statement: “I write those things that seem to me to be true, for the *logoi* of the Greeks, as they appear to me, are many and ridiculous,”³⁹ and Gorgias could entertain the possibility of absolving Helen from blame “if *logos* persuaded and deceived her soul.”⁴⁰ Although Heraclitus celebrated *logos*, while ignoring *mythos*, Parmenides introduced his discourse as follows: “Come, I will speak, and having heard my *mythos* you will carry it away.”⁴¹ In similar, if even more portentous fashion, Empedocles told his audience: “Deceit must not overcome your wits . . . But know these things clearly, having heard this *mythos* from a god.”⁴² Ultimately, it was Plato’s intervention that proved decisive and, by the time he was finished, the superiority of a sanitized and aggrandized “*logos*” over a trivialized and marginalized “*mythos*” had been secured. No serious argument would be made in favor of reversing those relations until the nineteenth century.

University of Chicago

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arrighetti, Graziano. 1981. “Il misoginismo di Esiodo,” in *Misoginia e maschilismo in Grecia e in Roma*. Genoa. 27–48.

———. 1984. *Esiodo: Teogonia*. Milan.

Arthur, Marilyn. 1983. “The Dream of a World Without Women: Poetics and the Circles of Order in the *Theogony* Proemium,” *Arethusa* 16.63–82.

Belfiore, Elizabeth. 1985. “Lies Unlike the Truth: Plato on Hesiod, *Theogony* 27,” *TAPA* 115.47–57.

39 Fragment 1 (Jacoby): ‘Εκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ὅδε μυθεῖται· τάδε γράφω, ὡς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσιν.

40 Fragment 82B11.8 (Diels-Kranz): εἰ δὲ λόγος ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας, οὐδε πρὸς τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολύσασθαι ὅδε.

41 Fragment 28B2.1 (DK): εἰ δ’ ἄγ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κομισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας. Cf. Fragment 28B8.1–2: μόνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν.

42 Fragment 31B23.9–11 (DK): οὔτω μή σ’ ἀπέτη φρένα καινύτω . . . ἀλλὰ τορῶς ταῦτ’ ἵσθι, θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας. Cf. 31B62.3: οὐ γὰρ μῦθος ἀπόσκοπος οὐδ’ ἀδαήμων.

Bergren, Ann. 1983. “Language and the Female in Early Greek Thought,” *Arethusa* 16.69–95.

Boeder, Herbert. 1959. “Der frühgriechische Wortgebrauch von Logos und Aletheia,” *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 4.82–112.

Bonnaté, Annie. 1983. “Le rossignol et la justice en pleurs,” *Bulletin de l’Association Guillaume Budé* 260–64.

———. 1985. *Eros et Eris: Mariages divins et mythe de succession chez Hésiode*. Lyon.

Brisson, Luc. 1982. *Platon, les mots et les mythes*. Paris.

Brown, Norman O. 1947. *Hermes the Thief*. New York.

Buongiovanni, Angelo. 1987. “La verità e il suo doppio (Hes. *Theog.* 27–28),” in *Interpretazioni antiche e moderne di testi greci*. Pisa. 9–24.

Calame, Claude. 1991. “‘Mythe’ et ‘rite’ en Grèce: des catégories indigènes?” *Kernos* 4.179–204.

Cornford, F. M. 1912. *From Religion to Philosophy*. New York.

Croci, Giancarlo. 1977/78. “Mito e poetica nell’ inno a Ermes,” *Bulletino dell’Istituto di Filologia greca, Università di Padova* 4.175–84.

Delgado, José A. Fernández. 1986. *Los Oráculos y Hesíodo: Poesía oral mántrica y gnómica griegas*. Salamanca.

Detienne, Marcel. 1986. *The Creation of Mythology*. Chicago.

Detienne, Marcel and Jean-Pierre Vernant. 1991. *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*. Chicago.

Ferrari, Giovanni. 1988. “Hesiod’s Mimetic Muses and the Strategies of Deconstruction,” in Andrew Benjamin, ed., *Post-Structuralist Classics*. London. 45–78.

Fournier, Henri. 1946. *Les verbes “dire” en grec ancien*. Paris.

Gould, Thomas. 1990. *The Ancient Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy*. Princeton.

Guthrie, W. K. C. 1962. *A History of Greek Philosophy I: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans*. Cambridge.

Havelock, Eric. 1963. *Preface to Plato*. Cambridge, Mass.

———. 1982. *The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences*. Princeton.

———. 1983. “The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics,” in Kevin Robb, ed., *Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy*. LaSalle, Ill. 7–81.

Herter, H. 1981. “L’Inno a Hermes alla luce della poesia orale,” in C. Brillante et al., eds., *I poemi epici rapsodici non omerici e la tradizione orale*. Padua. 183–201.

Jacoby, Felix. 1930. *Hesiodi carmina*. Berlin.

Kahn, Charles H. 1979. *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*. Cambridge.

Kahn, Laurence. 1978. *Hermès passe, ou les ambiguïtés de la communication*. Paris.

Kirk, G. S., J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield. 1983. *The Presocratic Philosophers*. Cambridge.

Leclerc, Marie-Christine. 1992. “Le rossignol et l'épervier d'Hésiode: Une fable à double sens,” *Revue des études grecques* 105.37–44.

———. 1993. *La parole chez Hésiode*. Paris.

Lincoln, Bruce. 1993. “Socrates’ Prosecutors, Philosophy’s Rivals, and the Politics of Discursive Forms,” *Arethusa* 26.233–46.

Lonsdale, Steven. 1989. “Hesiod’s Hawk and Nightingale (*Op.* 202–212), Fable or Omen?” *Hermes* 117.403–12.

Marquardt, Patricia A. 1982. “Hesiod’s Ambiguous View of Women,” *Classical Philology* 77.283–91.

Martin, Richard P. 1989. *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad*. Ithaca.

Martinazzoli, Folco. 1960. “Un epiteto esioideo della donna,” *Parola del Passato* 15.203–21.

Matthiessen, K. 1979. “Form und Funktion des Weltaltermythos bei Hesiod,” in G. W. Bowersock et al., eds., *Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard Knox*. Berlin. 25–32.

Mazon, Paul. 1928. *Hésiode: Théogonie, Les Travaux et les Jours, Le Bouclier*. Paris.

Neitzel, Heinz. 1980. “Hesiod und die Lügenden Musen,” *Hermes* 108.387–401.

Nestle, Wilhelm. 1940. *Vom Mythos zu Logos: die Selbstentfaltung des griechischen Denkens von Homer bis auf die Sophistik und Sokrates*. Stuttgart.

Parke, H. W. and D. E. W. Wormell. 1956. *The Delphic Oracle*. Oxford.

Pettazzoni, Raffaele. 1967. *Essays in the History of Religions*. Leiden.

Pratt, Louise. 1993. *Lying and Poetry from Homer to Pindar*. Ann Arbor.

Pucci, Pietro. 1976. *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry*. Baltimore.

Ramnoux, Clémence. 1987. “Les femmes de Zeus: Hésiode, Théogonie vers 885–955,” in Marcel Detienne and Nicole Loraux, eds., *Poikilia: Etudes offerts à Jean-Pierre Vernant*. Paris. 155–64.

Rosen, Stanley. 1988. *The Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry*. New York.

Rudhardt, Jean. 1986. "Pandora, Hésiode et les femmes," *Museum Helveticum* 43.231–46.

Schmidt, Jens Uwe. 1983. "Hesiode's *Ainos* von Habicht und Nachtigall," *Wort und Dienst* 17.55–76.

Schmitter, Peter. 1991. *Geschichte der Sprachtheorie*, Vol. 2. Tübingen.

Snell, Bruno. 1953. *The Discovery of the Mind*. London.

Solmsen, Friedrich. 1970. *Hesiodi Theogonia, Opera et Dies, Scutum*. Oxford.

Stroh, Wilfred. 1976. "Hesiode's lügende Muse," *Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie* 72.85–112.

Vernant, Jean-Pierre. 1974. *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, Vol. I. Paris.

Veyne, Paul. 1988. *Did the Greeks Believe in their Myths?* Chicago.

West, M. L. 1966. *Hesiod: Theogony*. Oxford.